Becoming Lincoln by Crofts, Daniel W
Civil War Book Review 
Winter 2019 Article 10 
Becoming Lincoln 
Daniel W. Crofts 
The College of New Jersey, crofts@tcnj.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr 
Recommended Citation 
Crofts, Daniel W. (2019) "Becoming Lincoln," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 . 
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.21.1.10 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol21/iss1/10 
Review 
 






Freehling, William W. Becoming Lincoln. University of Virginia Press, $29.95 
ISBN 9780813941561 
 
Politics “always came first” for Abraham Lincoln, writes William W. Freehling (128).  
The future “Great Emancipator” hesitated, however, to make America’s original sin part of his 
political agenda.  Only after “twenty years of antislavery silence” did he start to find a new voice 
(100).  
Freehling insists that Lincoln, all along, was driven “to save the Founders’ flawed 
republic” (106).  He wanted to resuscitate the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and give 
all men “an unfettered start, and a fair chance” (307).  But his sensitive political antenna 
constrained him.  Most Illinois whites were unmoved by the wrongs inflicted on Southern slaves 
and unwilling to see black people enjoy equal rights.   
From a young age Lincoln made his mark as a deft partisan organizer.  He labored to 
build up the Whig Party in a Democratic-dominated state.  He nevertheless regretted, Freehling 
contends, that antislavery remained politically off-limits.  Few shared his wish to “fan the feeble 
sparks” of white Southern antislavery (272).  The current generation had so regressed from the 
ideals of the Founders, Lincoln feared, as to preclude any “peaceful, voluntary emancipation” 
(155).   
In the mid-1850s Lincoln seized the opportunity to direct his organizing skills toward 
something more promising than the disintegrating Whigs.  He made himself the “supreme 
architect” of the Illinois Republican Party (96).  He reached out both to German immigrants and 
nativists, as well as to heretofore-antagonistic Democrats, Free Soilers, and Whigs.  The way to 
build a “moderate antislavery party” in Illinois was to emphasize that slavery expansion 
threatened free white Northerners (172).  Republicans also promised not to attack slavery in 
states where it already existed.  Lincoln rejected hardline Republicans demands—to abolish 
slavery in the District of Columbia, to overturn the Fugitive Slave Act, and to bar the admission 
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of new slave states.  Yet he had to convince radical Republicans led by Owen Lovejoy “to 
remain in the moderate-dominated party,” and Lovejoy had to believe that Lincoln too hated 
slavery (191).  There could be no Republican Party in Illinois unless the many voters in northern 
Illinois who saw slavery as a moral problem were willing to join with those in the central part of 
the state who would reserve western territories for free white settlers.   
Building a 51% majority of the electorate was an entirely different matter than hurling 
abolitionist thunderbolts.  Freehling recognizes that “many latter-day Americans, if transported 
back to the nineteenth century with twenty-first-century mentalities intact, would have joined 
abolitionist extremists, crusading for faster progress from the 1830s onward” (107).  But an 
“ocean,” he quips, separates the sixteenth president from posterity (148).  Lincoln saw 
antislavery as a gradual, long-run venture.  He often suggested that African-Americans might 
best be colonized elsewhere in the world, an idea that “inspires modern shudders” (148).  He 
thought the slave system might continue for another century.  In the heat of partisan combat he 
made far-fetched accusations—that Stephen A. Douglas concealed a “real zeal” to legalize 
slavery nationwide, North and South (161). 
Becoming Lincoln reveals a principled politician who tried to reconcile short-term 
partisan needs with consequential long-term national goals.  He demonstrated that “a mainstream 
leader who dominates the great middle and keeps in touch with one extreme can become a 
historic reformer” (321).  He always understood the imperative of holding together “a largely 
moderate majority” in a “largely conservative Union” (306).  Freehling adroitly charts his own 
course through a minefield of contradictory evidence.  He largely disdains historiographical one-
upmanship, but insiders will see how his multidimensional Lincoln harmonizes disparate 
interpretations.  Freehling’s Lincoln always was morally purposeful, even though a skeptic might 
complain that his antislavery commitment only became manifest once it offered partisan 
advantage. 
During Lincoln’s first month in office, he was bedeviled by the ticking time bomb at Fort 
Sumter, offshore from Charleston, South Carolina.  Freehling shows that a second endangered 
Union outpost—Fort Pickens, offshore from Pensacola, Florida—seemed for several key weeks 
to offer the new president a way to wriggle out of his excruciating Sumter dilemma.  But his 
subordinates fumbled Pickens’ reinforcement—and the war followed.  By then, Lincoln judged 
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that forcible means alone could preserve the legacy of the Founders.  That juncture also marked 
the knell of his long-cherished objective—peaceful, voluntary emancipation. 
Daniel W. Crofts, who taught at The College of New Jersey before his 2014 retirement, is the 
author of Lincoln and the Politics of Slavery: The Other Thirteenth Amendment and the Struggle 
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